166.155¹
Intimidation in the second degree
(1) A person commits the crime of intimidation in the second degree if the person:
(a) Tampers or interferes with property, having no right to do so nor reasonable ground to believe that the person has such right, with the intent to cause substantial inconvenience to another because of the persons perception of the others race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin;
(b) Intentionally subjects another to offensive physical contact because of the persons perception of the others race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin; or
(c) Intentionally, because of the persons perception of race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin of another or of a member of the others family, subjects the other person to alarm by threatening:
(A) To inflict serious physical injury upon or to commit a felony affecting the other person, or a member of the persons family; or
(B) To cause substantial damage to the property of the other person or of a member of the other persons family.
(2) Intimidation in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) For purposes of this section, property means any tangible personal property or real property. [1981 c.785 §1; 1983 c.521 §1; 1989 c.1029 §1; 2007 c.100 §18; 2011 c.421 §1]
Annotations Related
Notes of Decisions
It is constitutionally permissible to punish otherwise criminal conduct more severely when it is motivated by racial, ethnic or religious hatred than when it is motivated by individual animosity. State v. Beebe, 67 Or App 738, 680 P2d 11 (1984), Sup Ct review denied
Where defendant and anothr were charged and jointly tried for intimidation in first degree and other person was acquitted, defendant could be convicted and sentenced only for intimidation in second degree. State v. Martin, 109 Or App 483, 818 P2d 1301 (1991)
Law Review Citations
18 WLR 197 (1982); 28 WLR 455 (1992); 71 OLR 689 (1992); 72 OLR 157 (1993)
Chapter 166
Law Review Citations
51 OLR 427-637 (1972); 69 OLR 169 (1990)
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1 Legislative Counsel Committee, CHAPTER 166—Offenses Against Public Order; Firearms and Other Weapons; Racketeering, www.leg.state.or.us/ors/166.html (2011) (last accessed Mar. 25, 2012).
2 Legislative Counsel Committee, Annotations to the Oregon Revised Statutes, Cumulative Supplement - 2011, Chapter 166, http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/annos/166ano.htm (2011) (last acessed Mar. 25, 2012).
3 OregonLaws.org assembles these lists by analyzing references between Sections. Each listed item refers back to the current Section in its own text. The result reveals relationships in the code that may not have otherwise been apparent.
Notes of Decisions
It is constitutionally permissible to punish otherwise criminal conduct more severely when it is motivated by racial, ethnic or religious hatred than when it is motivated by individual animosity. State v. Beebe, 67 Or App 738, 680 P2d 11 (1984), Sup Ct review denied
Where defendant and another were charged and jointly tried for intimidation in first degree and other person was acquitted, defendant could be convicted and sentenced only for intimidation in second degree. State v. Martin, 109 Or App 483, 818 P2d 1301 (1991)
Law Review Citations
18 WLR 197 (1982); 28 WLR 455 (1992); 71 OLR 689 (1992); 72 OLR 157 (1993)
Chapter 166
Law Review Citations
51 OLR 427-637 (1972); 69 OLR 169 (1990)
Source: www.oregonlaws.org/ors/166.155